Iranian nuclear talks: Time running out?
The results from the latest talks between Iran and Western powers are emerging. lot of attention is being given to the direct involvement of the US government. The headline tells us all we really need to know about this situation however.
Iran rules out nuclear enrichment freeze
Joined by U.S. envoy, negotiators agree to resume talks in two weeks
GENEVA - Iran and the European Union’s chief negotiators agreed on Saturday to resume talks on suspending uranium enrichment in two weeks, after Tehran ruled out freezing its program in talks that included the United States for the first time.
The fundamental issue remains what it has always been. The US and to varying degrees, some of its key allies are concerned that Iran is working towards a nuclear weapons capability. In contrast, Iran argues that it has legitimate needs for nuclear energy and is well within its international rights to develop that capability. The key element in the debate is intent; perceived and actual.
The US sees Iran building the full Uranium fuel cycle from mining and processing of Uranium ore through to enrichment, fuel fabrication and re-processing and suspects that the intention is to develop a weapons capability. In response Iran argues that its intent is purely civilian. Iran’s oil and gas reserves will not last forever and using these to fuel Iranian electricity generation is a sub-optimal use of these resources. Better to export them and receive foreign exchange. Furthermore, since 1979 Iran has been a regular target of international sanctions, including a series of dubious measures intended to interfere with the construction of the nuclear reactors at Busher. As such it has learned that critical national capabilities, such as defense and energy generation, to name but two, should not rely on foreign suppliers.
Iran is undertaking a massive and expensive technical effort that draws resources away from other possible uses of those resources. Although it has benefited from cooperation with other nations such as Pakistan the effort is still substantial. The US looks at this and is suspicious, especially given the secrecy of the effort until recently. It also notes the Iranian determination to proceed with developing the full fuel cycle even though this is economically nonsensical when international enrichment and fuel-fabrication facilities are operating at levels far below capacity and could easily supply Iranian requirements.
The inescapable fact is that once Iran has all of these facilities operating it will have ALL of the requirements for the development of a nuclear weapons capability including a nuclear weapon design. At a minimum Iran will become a latent nuclear weapons state, as are Germany and Japan. At this point whether Iran develops a nuclear weapon will be a matter of choice and the international community will be unable to have much, if any influence on that choice.
In this context enrichment is the critical issue. Until Iran begins operating of its light water reactors (LWR) and completes construction of its reprocessing facility its only available route to a nuclear weapon is through enriched Uranium. Once the reprocessing facility starts to operate the plutonium route to the bomb opens, and opens quites rapidly. In the meantime Uranium enrichment remains the key. Iran is currently working to produce Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) suitable for LWR use. There is an argument that this is a perfectly legitimate activity.
However, historical example suggests that long-term production of LEU is a very series concern if a state is suspected of nuclear weapons ambitions. The most relevant example here is that of Pakistan which pledged to the USA in the 1980s that it would not enrich Uranium beyond standard LEU levels (3-5%). For a long time it held to this agreement but in amassing a large quantity of LEU it significantly reduced that time required to produce weapons-grade HEU. To work out the time saved a useful tool is this Uranium Enrichment Calculator from the WISE Uranium Project. With it we can quickly discover that by enriching to reactor grade now and then re-enriching to weapons grade later Iran could save as much as two-thirds of the effort during the critical final stage. To produce 41 kg of 90% HEU from 4% LEU takes 2681 SWU, but to get the same amount of HEU from natural Uranium feed takes 7916 SWU. Having said that, this figure is simply to illustrate the time-saving potential. Iran’s facilities can process much larger quantities of Uranium than is implied by the above calculation.
So it becomes clear why enrichment is so important, a point that unfortunately has not been made sufficiently clear to the general public. This is also why the negotiations and discussions with Iran cannot go indefinitely. The longer Iran is able to spin out the process of negotiation while it continues to enrich Uranium the less likely those negotiations are to produce a result that addresses the concerns of the US government and its partners. The more LEU the Iranians amass the easier it becomes for them to switch their efforts to the production of a nuclear weapon if they should choose to do so. Whether they actually choose to do this is actually less important than the capability to act on that choice. I find it hard to accept that this standoff, or stalemate if you prefer, can continue indefinitely.
As things stand the Iranians are getting everything they need by continuing this slow diplomatic process while the parties on the other side of the table are getting nothing at all.
It seems to me that there are a number of possible outcomes.
1) The US and its partners decide to abandon their efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring a latent nuclear weapons capability.
2) The US and potentially some or all of its partners conclude that Iran is simply stringing them along until it has in its hands all of the components for a nuclear weapon and decide to do nothing. This may mean that they conclude that Iran is not attempting to acquire an actual weapon, or that they decide that Iran’s acquisition of a weapon is not so important as to risk a confrontation.
3) The US and potentially some or all of its partners conclude that Iran is simply stringing them along until it has in its hands all of the components for a nuclear weapon and decide to force a confrontation.
Historically, for all of the discussion of using force to prevent a country from developing or deploying nuclear weapons this policy option has almost never been pursued. For one reason or another it simply has not seemed worthwhile to take the risks inherent in starting a war over the issue. This suggests that ultimately the Iranian case will also see a lot of bluster, some discussion of the use of force and ultimately a grudging acceptance of the development of a latent capability, or even a weapon if that should be the course the Iranians pursue.
Past examples may not however be a satisfactory guide in dealing with this case and not only because the application of historical examples to present cases is at best an imperfect art. Simply put, just because the goalkeeper jumped left every previous time he tried to stop a penalty does not mean that he will this time.
War is a real possibility when it comes to dealing with Iran, although it is hardly an agreeable one. For now, despite some occassional sabre rattling the US appears committed to negotiating and the Israeli’s appear willing to allow the process to run its course. Given Iran’s unwillingness to accept a rollback of its nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities this negotiation process is incapable of providing the results that the Western powers ultimately seek. Accordingly it is possible that the US has allowed it to proceed as it has in part at least to prepare the ground diplomatically for a war to come by making it clear to its allies that Iran is intransigent and that the only remaining option for preventing an undesireable outcome is force. It seems likely that if / when war with Iran comes it will be more widely accepted by the international community than the Iraq war of 2003 was. This is not to say that it will be welcomed but that is another matter entirely.
Anyway, the main point is that this process of kinda-negotiating about the possibility of Iran temporarily suspending its enrichment activities can not go on forever. When the road that is currently being walked by the negotiators comes to an end watch out. Ultimately the goals of the parties are utterly incompatible.
Tags: Iran