This issue is getting a lot of play today, rightly enough. Arms Control Wonk has some useful thoughts on the topic while ISIS has linked to the official US government talking points about the facility which definitely should serve as a starting point for all further readings and discussion.
The Iranian official line seems to be that the facility is a pilot plant which is all very well except that you usually build a pilot plant before you progress to the main industrial facility (Natanz) rather than after it is already operating. So, either we politely ask the Iranians to reconsider their “pilot plant” story or alternatively ask that they elaborate on just what it is they are doing here that is so different to the operations at Natanz that a new pilot facility is required. I expect that at the same time we can ask where the primary facility that this is a pilot for will be located and why this, presumably 3rd enrichment plant is required.
I am particularly interested in Geoff Forden’s observation at ACW that the Iranians may have been using Natanz as a training facility, even at the expense of getting the facility up and running at maximum efficiency. Technical projects in developing countries often suffer the ill-effects of a shallow pool of technicians and expert personnel. In much of the public discussion of potential scenarios for the bombing and presumably damaging of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure it is presumed that attacks of this sort would do little more than impose a temporary delay on the program while providing incentives for acceleration of any weaponization efforts. It seems to me that such discussions assume that Iran would still have its cadre of experienced qualified technicians, engineers and scientists after an attack and that these personnel would be able to swiftly restore the program. Probably not an unreasonable assumption in these days of precision bombing designed to minimize civilian casualties. However Forden’s observation, if it is correct, suggests that the Iranian government is not willing to rely on an attacker resisting the temptation to kill as many of its trained personnel in an attack as possible.
Air raids aimed at killing large numbers of technical personnel engaged in secret work on high-technology projects are not unprecedented. The most relevant case is probably the August 18, 1943 R.A.F. raid on Peenemunde. Due to the technical difficulties of successfully pulling off a night-time precision bombing attack in 1943 the raid did not achieve its goal of killing the leading engineering personnel or inflict substantial damage on key facilities. Nevertheless the goal of the operation was sound and if the initial targeting had been more effective it would have been difficult for Germany to continue with its A-4 missile program.
In the context of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure the enrichment plants, and the factories that produce centrifuges may be less valuable targets for an attacker than dormitories and residential facilities. However with the passing of time and the continuing expansion of the Iranian nuclear program the value of any particular individual will continue to decrease as they become less and less irreplaceable.